Prologue:         The clearest connection between the Torah reading and the
Haftora is the promise of the prophet Isaiah that Gods attribute of
Chessed will guarantee a Geulah. He notes Kee Mei Noach Lee (54:9) as a
reason for guaranteeing this promise. Redak notes that there are 2 ways of
reading (and thus interpreting) these words. One style sees three words
Kee Mei Noach loosely translated as for these are like the waters of
Noach. The other style sees the words Kee and Mei as one word Keemei
referring to the times of Noach (See Targum Yonasan). The two styles also
beg the question as to whether we blame Noach for the Mabul (Mei Noach) or
merely utilize his life as a marker in history for the period of the Mabul
(Keiyimei). If this is the case, how could one blame Noach for a flood
that was not his fault?

        HaRav Avraham Rivlin Shlita (MeiInvei HaKerem) noted that the two
opinions within the Haftorah might be based on the two opinions of Noach
in the Talmud (Sanhedrin 108a) where Rav Yochanan looked onto Noach as a
Tzaddik in his generation alone and Reish Lakish saw him as a Tzaddik in
all seasons and generations. Rav Rivlin suggested that Rav Yochanan might
read the Possuk in Isaiah as Mei Noach while Reishg Lakish might see it
only as a marker in time. Yet, one is still left asking why Noach (who was
after all, saved from the flood) was blamed from the flood  at least
according to Rav Yochanan?

        Rav Rivlin answered by citing a known Zohar that noted the
difference between Moshe and Noach. Moshe heard God call to him to leave
the people after the sin of the Golden calf. He refused. He asked how he
could forsake his people for personal gain. Noach, on the other hand,
never asked God to save the people. As a result, they died. Thus,
concludes the Zohar, the Mabul is called Noach's (even in literature it is
called Noyes Floode) for he didnt attempt to stop it.

        As great a person is, even if he is called an Ish Tzaddik Tamim,
if he does not demonstrate the Chessed to pray on behalf of his people and
feel their pain, he is not to be considered as anything other than Klum
and the waters that destroy his world, his fault.

Sheva Mitzvot: But do we force the issue??

        The Talmud (Sanhedrin 56a) lists the Sheva Mitzvot Bnei Noach and
asks how we know that they must keep them. The Talmud cites two
possibilities, both of which result from the verse stating the command to
Adam not to eat  from the Eitz HaDaas.

        The Rambam (Hil. Melachim 9:14) notes a responsibility of non-Jews
to set up a system of Judges to enforce the other six Mitzvot. Rambam adds
that in this manner we can understand why the rest of the city of Shechem
was liable for Shechems kidnapping of Dinah, they saw but didnt do
anything to stop or punish Shechem. Ramban (Berashis 34:13) disagrees. He
asks how Yaakov could have gotten upset with Shimon and Levi for
destroying the city of Shechem. The Ramban concludes that the Mitzva of
setting up courts is a Mitzva not only to punish evildoers but to teach
the people right from wrong. (However, if the courts are not set up, it is
a Bittul Aseh for which death is not an acceptable punishment.)
Accordingly, the courts have a right to introduce business law and
principles like Onaah and price gouging and these principles too, are to
be adhered to by the Bnei Noach in order to keep the Mitzva of Dinim.
According to Rema (Shut Rema, 10), the Ramban understands Dinim as a non
Jews requirement to create laws similar to the Torah (See Shut Chasam
Sofer Choshen Mishpat, 91). Others (Nachalat Yitzchak, C.M. 91; Chazon
Ish, Bava Kama 10:3; Shut Yichaveh Daas IV:65) seem to understand that
whatever legal system needs to be introduced by the court, irrespective of
its connection to Torah law, this is the responsibility of Dinim.

        This Machlokes should have important ramifications in regard to
whether Jews must educate and encourage non-Jews to fulfill the Seven
Mitzvot. According to the Rambam, the obligation of Dinim applies to Jews
and non-Jews equally. This position is maintained by most contemporary
Poskim (See Iggros Moshe Y.D. I:6; Teshuva from Rav Shlomo Zalman in
Moriah XI:Tet/Yud, 64). The Ohr Sameach (Issurei Biah 3:5) actually
obligates a boy who understands right and wrong but is not a Bar Mitzva,
to fulfill the 7 Mitzvot. In this regard, Jews join Non-Jews in some way,
in the obligations of the 7 Mitzvot.

        But do we have an obligation to pay for educating the Ben Noach?

        From the Rambam (Hil. Melachim 8:10) it sounds as if the Jewish
nation, or at least the Jewish courts, should educate the non-Jews to
honor their Mitzvot. Maharitz Chayos (Shut Maharitz Chayos II) vehemently
disagrees. He writes that perhaps Moshe had such a requirement but that
after Maamad Har Sinai, no Jew could have an obligation to force
compliance and certainly not in the Galut where Jews are not in charge.
Indeed, the author of the Sefer HaChinuch (192) notes that our obligations
are active only when they are under our hands.

        Shut Machane Chaim (II: O.C. 22) argues. Rav Chaim Sanzer felt
that the Mitzvah of Dinim had two components to it. The first was to set
up courts with judges who know the law. The second was to educate the
populace in order to make sure that people who violate the law know why
they are being punished. According to his approach, we must educate (and
perhaps even pay to educate) Bnei Noach about their laws and the need to
keep them.

        The late Lubavitcher Rebbe had another interesting approach as to
why Jews might be obligated to educate non-Jews about 7 Mitzvot Bnei
Noach. In an article written for Hapardes (59:Ix, 10), The Rebbe contends
that since the Rambam noted that there is an obligation to educate
non-Jews, we must do so. As to the claim that none of the other Poskim
seem to discuss this obligation, he feels this is due to the fear of
intermixing and the potential for assimilation that might have happened if
it occurred. However, today, with changing times, one can safely educate
non-Jews about the Noachide code and have them comply. This opinion has
been challenged extensively (See Dinei Yisroel, XIX, 108). And at best
seems to be accepted as a Heter to teach not as an obligation (See Yabia
Omer I: Y.D. 17; Sridei Eish II:92; Contemporary Halachic Problems II:

Shabbat Shalom